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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LEAH RICHINS,

Plaintiff,

vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
VTAH, OTTO A. WIESLEY, CARLYLE
F. GRONNING, and JOHN R. SCHONE,
its members, and R I C H A R D G .
MITCHELL,
Defendants.

Case No.
10504

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE

This proceeding is an appeal from the Order of the
Industrial Commission of Utah denying the Petition for
Re-hearing of the Plaintiff.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 8, 1963, the defendant, Richard G. Mitchell
hired the plaintiff to work in a Day-Nite Laundercenter in
Salt Lake City, Utah.
The plaintiff was assisting the defendant Mitchell on
July 2, 1963, with certain repairs to an overhead air conditioner in the building. The grille from the air conditioner
fell, striking the plaintiff on the head. The plaintiff was
hospitalized and suffered severe and disabling injuries.
On June 21, 1964, the plaintiff filed an application for
benefits before the Industrial Commission of Utah. It was
subsequently determined that the defendant Mitchell carried no insurance as required by 35-1-46 Utah Code Annota,ted, 1953, as Amended. The case was noticed for hearing
on October 21, 1964.
At the hearing, the question was raised by defendant
l\fitchell whether the plaintiff had brought the proceeding
against the right party, that is, her employer, inasmuch as
at the time of the accident defendant Mitchell was the receiver of the business, having been appointed in Case No.
141335, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The Commission terminated the hearing, indicating that a medical panel should be
convened to determine injuries. It was stipulated by counsel for the plaintiff and counsel for the defendant Mitchell
that the accident in question arose out of and during th~
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course of plaintiff's employment. No testimony was taken,
nor argument heard, on the question of whether the defendant Mitchell, receiver of the Laundercenter, was the
employer of the plaintiff under the Workmen's Compensation Statutes.
By Order of December 10, 1964, the Industrial Comi:Jission denied the claim of plaintiff. The Commission suggested in that Order that the claim for compensation for
injuries would properly lie against Loren and Edith Nelson,
the party defendants in the civil action in which Richard G.
il'fi~chell was appointed receiver.

Plaintiff petitioned the Industrial Commission for a
re-hearing of her cause on January 6, 1965. Plaintiff supplied, at the request of the Commission, a Brief in support
of her position. The Petition for Re-Hearing was denied by
Urder of the Commission of February 3, 1967.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Plaintiff respectfully prays that this Court reverse the
Order of the Industrial Commission, holding as a matter
of law that defendant Richard G. Mitchell was the employer of the plaintiff; that the Court remand this case
to the Industrial Commission for further hearing and an
<.ppropriate award of compensation.
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ARGUMENTS
POINT I.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH ACTED
IN AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER IN
THAT IT ERRED IN HOLDING THE RECEIVER IS
NOT AN EMPLOYER UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW.
A. A receiver may be an employer under Work.
men's Compensation law.
The limited case law authority is clear that a receiver
may be an employer, and liable to a workmen's compensation claimant. The Michigan case of Bredeweg vs. First
State Bank of Holland, et al, 280 Mich. 247, 273 N.W. 550
( 1937), involves an injured employee claiming against a
receiver of a national bank. Judge Butzel states therein,
"It is entirely within the spirit of the Act (Workmen'~
Compensation Statute) that such receiver and conservators
remain liable under the Act until they withdrew ... Undoubtedly, the employees had a right to believe that they
were being protected under the Act and the liability thus
created."
In the case of Urine v. Salina Northern R.R. Co., 104
Kan. 236, 178 Pac. 614 ( 1919), the defense of a receiver
was raised by a railroad company and was expressly disallowed. Text authority is found at 99 C.J.S. Workmen's
Compensation, #40 and #55, wherein it is pointed out,
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''. .. one who makes a contract of employment as a receiver is liable to the employee injured on the job ... "
Further authority is found at Annotation, 111 A.L.R.
"Undoubtedly a receiver may be an 'employer' within
the meaning of that term as used in the State Compensation
Ad, but whether he is an employer in a particular case is
to be determined from an examination of the existing facts
and circumstances." 58 Am. Jur. Workmen's Compensation
;'.:;:346, ''A receiver appointed or empowered to operate a
business may be an employer, within the meaning of that
trrm used in a Compensation Act, and liable as such for
the payment of compensation for an injury to an employee ... "
~.28,

The Courts of Georgia and New Jersey have passed
,m the question of whether the definition of employer under

Workmen's Compensation extends to receivers. Both states,
as set out in Minchew v. Huston, et al, 193 Georgia 272, 18
S.E. 2d 487 (1942), and in Michell v. Haines, 122 N.J.L.
~92, 5 A. 2d 68 (1939), have ruled in favor of inclusion of
receivers as employers. In 1936, the Pennsylvania Court
also ruled that a receiver, or conservator of a bank, may
be an employer for purposes of Workmen's Compensation.
Indiana has an express statutory provision in its Workmen's Compensation law that includes a reciever. Acting
thereunder, the Indiana Supreme Court in Barker v. Eddy,
~!7 Ind. 94, 185 N.E. 878 (1933), ruled that an employer,
"includes a receiver who uses the services of another for
pay in the business of the receivership." The case of An-
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derson v. Polleys, 53 R.I. 182, 165 A. 436 (1933), also hold .
that a receiver of a corporation is an employer under the
\Vorkmen's Compensation law, when the employee w·is
' no,,
given notice of any change in the relationship of emp1•0\-.
ment.
·
B. ~ ~asic ~olicy of Workmen's Compensation Act
Is mclus10n of coverage, not exclusion.
There are many cases arising under Workmen's Compensation statutes which are not covered by the expreso
language of the statutes. The basic policies of the statutes
are best furthered by inclusion of the employers-employees
than by exclusion.
The case of Caughman v. Columbia YMCA, 212 So.C,
337, 47 S.E. 2d 788 (1948), clearly states that the definition of employer should be broadly or liberally construed
in order to effectuate the policies of the Act. Any doubt as
to jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of inclusion
rather than exclusion. Hopkins v. Darlington Veneer Co.,
208 So.C. 307 38 S.E. 2d 4 (1946).
C. The policy of Workmen's Compensation of protecting a worker from injuries sustained in the
job would not be effectuated by granting immunity to a receiver.
The policy of Workmen's Compensation is clear that
a person who hires another and agrees to pay for the service of the other must afford some protection to the employee for on the job injuries. The ruling of the Industrial
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Commission, however, would allow the receiver an immunity from the rigors of compliance. A receiver, under the
ruling of the Industrial Commission, could hire, directly supervise and control, pay, or even fire an employee, all withriut affording the protection to an employee every other employer must bear. The statutes would never have been drawn
contemplating such a manifestly inequitable result.
In this case, the plaintiff was hired by the defendant
~VIitchell. The supervision, direction and control over plaintiff's on-the-job activities was exercised by the defendant
Mitchell. The plaintiff was given checks for her services
from the defendant Mitchell. The withholdng tax or W-2
form was given plaintiff by defendant Mitchell.
All of these facts, plus further facts which could be
developed at a full hearing, are persuasive that the defendant Mitchell was employing the applicant. Mitchell was apprised of the claim of plaintiff; in fact, he made direct payment of some of her medical bills. The receivership, however, was allowed to terminate without resolving the claim
of plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that a reasonable inference
to be drawn from such an action is that Mtichell himself
considered the liability, rights, and obligations arising
from the accident attached to him personally.
D. Section 35-1-42, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
Amended, can reasonably be interpreted to include a receiver as employer.
The pertinent parts of the statutory section are as follows: "The following shall constitute employers subject to
the provisions of this title: (2) Every person, firm and
private corporation, including every public utility, having
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in service one or more workmen or operatives regular!.
employed in the same business, or in or about the same l
es.
tablishment, under any contract of hire, express or em.
ployed, oral or written, ..." Plaintiff submits that "every
person" must include the defendant-receiver in order to pro.
mote the policy of Workmen's Compensation. In Ortega ,
Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 108 UTAH 1, 156 P.2d 885
P945), the Chief Justice Larson states, "The Compensation
Act, first enacted in 1917, is predicated upon the police
power, the right of the State to regulate the status of em.
ployer and employee, for the general welfare of the people
of the state. (Citing cases) It is a beneficent act, passeci
to protect employees, and those dependent upon them, and
to tax the costs of human wreckage against the industry
which employs it, such burden being added to the price of
the products and thereby spread over the general consum.
jng users of the product of the industry." p. 887. "It is to
be liberally construed in favor of the injured workman."
p. 888. Further, Chief Justice Larson states, "As far as the
'employer' is concerned, the term is broad enough to cover
all employment relationships." With this policy and liberal
rule of construction in mind, the Commission was arbitrary
and capricious in denying the claim of plaintiff on the
basis that the receiver was not the employer.
POINT II.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH DENIED
PLAINTIFF DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY DENYING
HER CLAIM WITHOUT A FULL HEARING.
At the initial hearing in the Industrial Commision, the
following events took place: The parties convened, in per-
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son and represented by counsel, before Otto A. Weisley,
(ine of the members of the Industrial Commission. The
question was raised by the Commission whether the accident occurred during the course of plaintiff's employment.
The parties agreed that the accident happened in the course
of employment.
At this point, counsel for Richard G. Mitchell raised
the question whether the claim of plaintiff was properly
against Mr. Mitchell, since he was a receiver of the business. An informal discusison was had on this question and
the hearing terminated. Thereafter, the Commission denied plaintiff's claim.
The Commission heard virtually no testimony, received
nv evidence, examined no exhibits, and entertained little
argument before its decision to deny the claim. While
plaintiff will concede the expertise of the Commission in
matters relating to employment relationships, it is also
clear that their decision must be based upon competent
evidence, from even a minimal record, and cannot be arbitrarily given on no evidence at all.
Due process of law requires that any valuable rights,
such as those herein of plaintiff, must not be denied without a reasonable basis in fact and law. The decision herein
was based upon a paucity of fact and, plaintiffs submits,
was directly contrary to law.
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POINT III.
A RECEIVER MAY BE PERSONALLY LIABLE O'i
CONTRACTS AND THUS LIABLE UNDER WORI:
MEN'S COMPENSATION ACT FOR INJURIES TO AX
EMPLOYEE INJURED ON THE JOB.
A corollary and necessary determination is whether ,
receiver may be personally liable on his contracts, and thus
personally liable to an employee for Workmen's Compen.
sation. The definitive Tardy's Smith on Receivers points cu
on page 169, "A receiver may be personally liable in, ,
contract entered into by him without the sanction of 'tht
Court, even though in relation to a matter which otherwi&:
would be a charge against the receivership." Further, on
page 269, "In other words, a receiver has no principal behind him in the sense of an ordinary agent, for whom he
can promise and hence, unless authorized so to do by the
Court which appointed him, his promises and contract
will bind him individually."
Plaintiff contends that there are sufficient facts before the Court to hold the defendant Mitchell personally
liable on the contract of employment of plaintiff. The result of this finding would clearly leave the plaintiff entitled
to an award from the Industrial Commission.
The claim of an injured workman has its basis on the
contract and fact of employment. It necessarily follows that
if Mitchell, as receiver, was the employer of plaintiff, anc
the fact of employment existed, the receiver must be held
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personally liable for this claim. The plaintiff submits that
enough fact has been established for the finding of personal
liability.
The property and business transferred in the District
Court proceeding to the receiver was never returned to the
prior owners. The initial claim herein was processed against
the "Mitchell Laundercenter." Although it subsequently developed that defendant has no Workmen's Compensation
insurance, defendant Mitchell at one time advised the
plaintiff that insurance was available. If further facts are
11ecessary to find the personal liability of defendant, a
hearing could be had for this purpose upon remand.
Denial of plaintiff's claim would have a curious and
inequitable result. Plaintiff, an injured worker entitled to
the protection of the statutes, would have no right of recovery. Plaintiff submits that the suggestion of the Commission that the claim should be processed against Loren
and Edith Nelson, the prior owners of the laundercenter, is
entirely without legal merit. The Workmen's Compensation
claim must have a direct relationship to a status of
employer-employee. Here, the Nelsons neither hired, supervised, paid, or in any way controlled the activities of plaintiff at the laundercenter. Law and equity would not be
served by shifting the responsibility and liability of the
one who hired plaintiff to strangers to this proceeding.
75 C.J.S. Receivers #157, clearly points out that a receiver who hires agents or employees to assist him in the
conduct of the business, without specific approval of the
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Court, does so "at his peril." "His authority to enter into
such employment contracts includes the usual obligations o;
8Uch contracts." p. 797.

CONCLUSION
1. The Industrial Commission acted in excess of ii,
powers in determining as a matter of law that defendant
Mitchell was not the employer of plaintiff.

2. The Commission acted in excess of its powers o:'
denying plaintiff's claim without a full hearing as required
by due process of law.
3. The Order of the Commission is arbitrary and capricious and has no basis in fact or law; and the findings
of fact herein do not support denial of plaintiff's claim.
4. The cause should be remanded to the Industrial
Commission for an appropriate award of compensation.
Respectfully submitted,
JOSEPH P. McCARTHY
IRENE WARR
LAREN D. BATES

Attorneys for the Plaintiff

